Abstract-This correspondence gives an achievable rate equivocation region for the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with side information. We extend our results to the Gaussian case. The main contribution of this correspondence is that, for the Gaussian wiretap channel, the side information helps to get a larger secrecy capacity and a larger rate equivocation region.
I. INTRODUCTION
The concept of wiretap channel was first introduced by Wyner [1] . The model which he proposed is shown in Fig. 1 . Assume that the wiretapper knows the encoding scheme used at the transmitter and the decoding scheme used at the legitimate receiver. The objective is to maximize the rate of reliable communication from the source to the legitimate receiver, subject to the constraint that the wiretapper learns as little as possible about the source output.
Wyner [1] has determined the achievable rate equivocation region when both channels are discrete memoryless channels. He shows that in most cases there is a secrecy capacity C s . By operating at rates below C s , it is possible to ensure that the wiretapper is essentially no better informed about s k after observing z N than he was before. Especially when both channels are binary symmetric channels, the secrecy capacity is the difference of the capacities of the main and overall wiretap channels.
Leung-Yan-Cheong [2] , [3] and Hellman [3] examined a special class of wiretap channels. They showed that, when both channels are either symmetric discrete memoryless channels or Gaussian channels, the secrecy capacity is the difference of the capacities of the main and overall wiretap channels.
Csiszár and Körner [4] investigated a more general situation: the broadcast channel with confidential messages. They proved that, for a discrete memoryless wiretap channel as shown in Fig. 2 , the secrecy capacity can be expressed as C s = max U !X!(Y;Z) [ In this case, the secrecy capacity satisfies C s = max p(x) [I(X; Y ) 0 to now, the problem of secrecy capacity for the discrete memoryless wiretap channels of these two models has been solved. Mitrpant et al. [6] investigated an extension of Wyner's model: the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. The model is shown in Fig. 3 . They also gave an achievable rate equivocation region [6, Theorem 3] .
We know from [7] , [8] that, the capacity of a discrete memoryless channel with state information V noncausally known at the transmitter is given by C = max p(u;x jv) [I(U ; Y ) 0 I (U ; V )], where the maximum is taken over all input distributions p(u; x j v) with a finite-alphabet auxiliary random variable U . This result was extended to the Gaussian case by Costa in [9] , where he considered the Gaussian channel with side information when side information is known to the transmitter. Costa described this channel using an analogy of writing on dirty paper. So the channel is also named dirty paper channel. The communication problem over the dirty paper channel can be stated as follows. Imagine a sheet of paper covered with independent dirt spots having normally distributed intensity. The transmitter writes a message on it using a limited amount of ink and sends it to a receiver. Along the way the paper acquires more normally distributed dirt. The question is: how much information can be reliably sent, assuming that the recipient cannot distinguish between ink and dirt. Surprisingly, Costa [9] showed that the dirty paper channel has the same capacity as the corresponding Gaussian channel. Therefore, the original dirt on the paper (i.e., side information) has no effect on the channel capacity.
Note that the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information is an extension of the dirty paper channel by introducing a wiretapper. Using a similar approach of writing on dirty paper, we consider the following communication problem: the transmitter wants to send a secret to a receiver and he knows there is a wiretapper. He writes the secret on a paper using a limited amount of ink and sends it. Along the way to the legitimate receiver, the paper acquires normally distributed dirt. Assume that the wiretapper has access to the paper with additional normally distributed dirt. Now the question of our interest is: how much secret information can be reliably and securely sent to the legitimate receiver without leaking information about the secret to the wiretapper. If the transmitter uses a blank paper (i.e., without side information), he can send secret information at rates up to the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wiretap channel, which is equal to the difference of the capacities of the main and overall wiretap channels as shown by Leung-YanCheong and Hellman [3] . However, to achieve reliable, efficient and especially secure communication, we wonder whether a dirty paper might be a better choice than the blank paper as one would choose intuitively.
In order to answer the above question, we first investigate the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with side information. The model is shown in Fig. 4 . Then we extend our result for the discrete memoryless case to the Gaussian case. We derive an achievable region for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. We compare the performance of the region with the one given by Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [3, Theorem 1] and show how side information influences the secrecy capacity and the rate equivocation region.
The correspondence is organized as follows. In Section II, we present the basic definitions and the main result. In Section III, we show the proof of the coding theorem for the discrete memoryless channel with side information. In Section IV, we derive an achievable rate equivocation region for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. Finally, we conclude in Section V.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this correspondence, we will denote random variables U; V ; X; etc. by capital letters and their ranges by corresponding script letters. Let U be a finite set. Denote its cardinality by jUj. Consider U N . The members of U N will be written as u N = (u1; u2; . . . ; uN ); where subscripted letters denote the components and superscripted letters denote the vector. A similar convention applies to random vectors and random variables, which are denoted by uppercase letters.
We consider the situation as given in Fig. 4 
Assume that S k is uniformly distributed on f1; 2; . . . ; M g. Then
The average probability of error P e is given by
We define the rate of transmission to the legitimate receiver to be
and the fractional equivocation of the wiretapper to be
Clearly, we have H(S k j Z N ) = N Rd.
We say that the pair (R 
where U is an auxiliary parameter such that U ! (X; V ) ! Y ! Z forms a Markov chain. In general, we have the following result. Then the set R, defined as follows, is achievable:
The region is already obtained if we limit the cardinality of the range of U by the constraint jUj jXjjVj + 3. The constraint is implied by where C M is the capacity of the main channel and C 0 s is the secrecy capacity. In order to establish the achievability of the entire region, Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman [3] These correspond to the situation of perfect secrecy. Define
The following theorem, which bounds the secrecy capacity of the wiretap channel with side information, clarifies this remark.
Theorem 2:
For the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with side information,
where CM is the capacity of the main channel. 
III. THE PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we establish the achievability of the region R.
We only need to prove that the rate equivocation pairs (R U 1 ; 1) and (R U 2 ; d U 2 ) are achievable, since time-sharing then implies the achievability of the region R 0 U .
A. (R U 1 ; 1) is Achievable
The encoding and decoding strategy is as follows: 1) Codebook Generation: (See Fig. 5 ) First, generate We will prove in the following that (RU1; 1) is achievable in two parts, the reliability: P e ! 0, as n ! 1, and the security:
The above encoding and decoding strategy is similar to the one used in [7] - [9] . Hence, by similar arguments as in [7] - [9] , it is easy to show that the information rate RU1 from the transmitter to the legitimate receiver is achievable. For more details, please refer to Appendix A.
Proof of d ! 1:
Consider the uncertainty of the message to the wiretapper in three steps: 1) show that
(See the codebook generation in Section III-A.) 2) show that Here P SB means a wiretapper's error probability in the case where the bin and the subbin number are known to the wiretapper.
3) show that for arbitrary 0 < < 1=2; PSB .
Combining the above steps, we have
We now proceed to step 1) by considering Thus the proof of step 1) is completed.
To prove step 2), we need to bound the entropy of the codeword conditioned on the bin j, subbin w and the wiretapper's observation z N .
We take the subbin w in bin j as a codebook, U N in the codebook as the input messages, Z N as the result of passing U N through the channel. Thus we complete the proof of step 2). Now we proceed to step 3). Note that given the codebook described in the proof of step 2)
• the decoder g( 1 ) knows the indices of the bin and the subbin, i.e., j and w;
• the estimate g(z N ) can be arbitrary.
Here we set g(z N ) as u N , the one in the codebook which is jointly typical with z N , i.e., [12] . When one of the following events occurs, an error is declared.
• E Z (j; w) : there is no sequence u N in the codebook that is jointly typical with the received sequence z N .
• E Z (j; w) : some other sequence in the codebook is jointly typical with the received sequence z N .
Then, P SB can be bounded as follows: Thus, we have bounded PSB for given arbitrary small and , when UZ > 3 and N > maxfN 1 ; N 2 g;P SB . This completes the proof of step 3 and consequently also the security d ! 1, as N ! 1.
B. (R U 2 ; d U 2 ) is Achievable
From (7), (8) and (9) it follows that if I(U ; V ) I(U ; Z), then the rate equivocation pair (R U ; d U ) coincides with (R U ; 1). So we 
The encoding and decoding strategy is as follows. Since the proof is similar to the reliability proof inSection III-A. We omit it here. Here P B means a wiretapper's error probability in the case where the bin number is known to the wiretapper.
3) show that for arbitrary 0 < < 1=2; P B . Since the proof is similar to the security proof in Section III-A. We omit it here.
IV. EXAMPLE
As we have discussed in Remark b) after the statement of Theorem 1 , the technique we use to establish the region R is more general compared with the one used by Mitrpant et al. [6] for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. Here we make use of the same auxiliary random variable U as Mitrpant et al. [6] . Applying our technique given in Section III, we extend Theorem 1 to the Gaussian case. See Appendix B for more details. As a direct consequence of our technique, we improve the rate equivocation region of the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information given by Mitrpant et al. [6, Theorem 3] as you will see in the following.
Consider the situation as shown in Fig. 3 . Similarly to Mitrpant et al.
[6], we use the auxiliary random variable U = X +V , where X and V are independent random variables distributed according to N(0;P) and N(0;Q), respectively, and is a real number to be specified. As- 
Denote the region as R ? . It is shown in Fig. 7 . Note that for fixed points (R; d) on the curve Rd = RZ(); can be determined by the value of R. Unlike the region for some special wiretap channels shown in [2] , [3] , here R Z () is not a constant. In addition, due to Lemma 9, RZ() is decreasing, as R goes from R(0) to CM when P low P P high and as R goes from R(1) to C M when P P high . Fig. 7 . An achievable rate equivocation region for Gaussian wiretap channel with side information. (a)0 < P P (b)P P (c)P P .
We define a rate equivocation region is better or larger than another one, if at the same rate of reliable transmission to the legitimate receiver, a larger equivocation for the wiretapper can be achieved.
Compare our region R ? with R L defined in (11) for the corresponding Gaussian wiretap channel without side information. The following results show that the side information plays a positive role in the secret communication over the Gaussian wiretap channel.
Theorem 4:
For the Gaussian wiretap channel, the side information helps to get a larger secrecy capacity.
Proof: Since the rate equivocation pair (minfR Z ( 3 ); C M g; 1) is achievable, we have Cs minfRZ ( 3 ); CMg. is the secrecy capacity of the corresponding Gaussian wiretap channel [3, (14) ]. Thus we complete the proof.
Theorem 5:
For the Gaussian wiretap channel, the side information helps to achieve a larger rate equivocation region.
Proof:
Compare the region R ? with R L defined in (11). a) When 0 < P P low ; C M C 0 s . b) When P low P P high ; RZ() is decreasing as R goes from R( 0 ) to C M . Therefore, R Z () R Z ( 3 ) C 0 s . c) When P P high ; R Z () is decreasing as R goes from R(1) to CM. Therefore, RZ(1) RZ() RZ( 3 ) C 0 s .
As we have discussed above, the theorem is concluded.
Recall that the region R M given by Mitrpant et al. [6, Theorem 3] can be expressed as follows:
Rd C M 0 < P P low minfC M d C ; R( 0 )g P low P P high minfCM dC; RZ(1)g P P high where d C = 1 0 I(U ; Z)=C M . An easy comparison shows the following result.
Corollary 6:
The region R ? is better than R M .
Proof: We compare the region R ? with R M . Since C M d C = CM 0 I(U ; Z) = RZ( 3 ) 0 I(U ; V ), then a) When P low P P high , as R goes from R( 0 ) to
In addition that when 0 < P P low ; R ? and R M are the same, we complete the proof.
From above proof, minfC M d C ; R( 0 )g = C M d C exists in both cases when P low P P high and P P high . Hence, the region RM can be simplified as follows:
Rd CM 0 < P P low C M d C P P low :
In this correspondence, we give an achievable rate equivocation region for the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with side information. Extending our result to the Gaussian case, we derive a better region than the one given by Mitrpant et al.. [6, Theorem 3] . It is very interesting to find that, for the wiretap channel in Gaussian case, unlike the dirty paper channel, the side information helps to get a larger secrecy capacity. Furthermore, for the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information, the rate equivocation region is also larger than the one for the Gaussian wiretap channel given in [3, Theorem 1] . Therefore, the side information provides an advantage to achieve secure communication over the Gaussian wiretap channel. However, it is still an open problem whether R s is the secrecy capacity of the discrete memoryless wiretap channel with side information. Whether R completely characterizes the rate equivocation region also remains unknown.
APPENDIX A
Proof of Pe ! 0 in Section III-A:
For the legitimate receiver, there are three sources of potential error.
• E V (j): In the encoding process, given v N and message j, there is no sequence u N in the bin j that is jointly typical with v N .
• E Y (j): In the decoding process, there is no sequence u N that is jointly typical with the received sequence y N .
• E Y (j): In the decoding process, there is a sequence u N (j 0 ) in bin j 0 ; j 0 6 = j, jointly typical with the received sequence y N . We first analyze the probability of E V (j). We say a pair (u This concludes the proof of reliability.
APPENDIX B
Theorem 1 in the Gaussian Case: Consider the Gaussian wiretap channel with side information as shown in Fig. 3 . We make use of the auxiliary random variable U = X +V , where is a real number and X is independent of V . Denote R U as the set of points (R; d) with RU1 R RU2; 0 d 1;Rd = RU1, where RU1 and RU2 are defined in (7) and (8) . Let where represents the set of all real numbers.
Proof:
The proof is almost the same as the proof of Theorem 1 given in Section III. We only need to show that R U is achievable for the specified and U. Assume that the channel has power constraint P and the side information satisfies V N(0;Q). For a fixed , let P 0 = P (1 + 4ln2) 01 . Due to the Gaussian characteristic of the channel, we make slight modifications in the achievability proof of R U as follows.
• In the codebook generation, sequences u N are generated according to f(u N ) = N i=1 f(u i ). Here we specify f(ui) N(0;P 0 + 2 Q) for all i 2 f1;2; ...;Ng. As a consequence of these modifications, there is one more source of potential error for the legitimate receiver.
• E X (j): in the encoding process, x N (j) = u N (j) 0 v N does not satisfy the power constraint.
However, provided that there is at least one sequence u N (j) jointly typical with v N , the probability that E X (j) occurs is 0 according to [6, Lemma A.1]. Therefore, the modifications do not influence the achievability proof of RU. Let be arbitrarily small. Since P 0 ! P as ! 0, we have shown that R U is asymptotically achievable for 2 and U = X +V , where X is independent of V and X N(0;P). Thus we conclude our proof.
APPENDIX C
Easy calculations show the following lemmata. and 0 is defined in (19). Lemma 8: R(), which is defined in (16), is an increasing function with respect to as < 3 ; a decreasing function as > 3 ; maximized at = 3 . In particular, R( 3 ) = CM . 3 is defined in (18).
Lemma 9: R Z (),which is defined in (17), is an increasing function with respect to as 0P=Q < < 1; a decreasing function as < 0P=Q or > 1; minimized at = 0P=Q and maximized at = 1.
APPENDIX D

Proof of Theorem 3:
Proof: By the argument in Appendix B and Lemma 7, we know that at perfect secrecy, R Z () is achievable when 00 0 ; R() is achievable when 00 or 0 . Assume that P; Q; N1; N2 0. Comparing 0 with 3 and 1, we have the following three cases. a) 00 0 3 .
This case occurs when 0 P P low . P low is defined in (20).
In this case, due to Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, the maximal rate at perfect secrecy is R( 3 ) = C M . b) 3 0 1.
This case occurs when P low P P high . P high is defined in (21). In this case, due to Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, the maximal rate at perfect secrecy is R(0) = RZ(0). When R(0) > R = R() C M ; d = R Z ()=R() is achievable. c) 0 1.
This case occurs when P P high . In this case, due to Lemma 8 and Lemma 9, the maximal rate at perfect secrecy is R Z (1) . When R Z (1) R = R() R(1), by time sharing, the rate equivocation pair satisfying Rd = RZ(1) is achievable. When R(1) < R = R() C M ; d = R Z ()=R() is achievable.
Thus we conclude our proof.
